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This paper deals with the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical statistical physical key 
exchange method and surveys criticism—often stemming from a lack of understanding of its 
underlying premises or from other errors—and our related responses against these, often 
unphysical, claims. Some of the attacks are valid, however, an extended KLJN system remains 
protected against all of them, implying that its unconditional security is not impacted. 
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The Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical statistical physical key exchange 
method [1–12] offers unconditional (information theoretic) security without quantum 
physics by utilizing the laws of classical statistical physics. This paper outlines a 
selection of our published responses to various criticisms of the security of the KLJN 
scheme. Some of the attacks were valid, such as the (Bergou-) Scheuer-Yariv resistance 
attack [11] and Hao’s temperature attack [12] however by investing sufficient resources 
the leaked information can be made arbitrarily small and hence its unconditional security 
is not impacted [1]. Furthermore, when the resources are limited, the extended KLJN 
system (that includes public comparison of data measured by Alice and Bob and the 
related rejection of bits when their security is compromised beyond a chosen threshold) is 
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naturally protected against all of them. Recent important development is that all wire 
resistance based attacks can be eliminated by a simple trick, by introducing another 
proper non-ideality feature see [13]. Several other attacks originated from the lack of 
understanding of the KLJN scheme or that of the definition of unconditional security.  
 
The conclusion of these debates is that the unconditional security of the existing KLJN 
schemes stands firm. 
 
The most important aspects of the talk have been addressed in publications (e.g., [1–8]) 
and are briefly presented below. Three essential points concerning the KLJN scheme are 
as follows: 
 
1. Unconditional security of the ideal KLJN scheme at passive (i.e. listening) attacks is 
guaranteed by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Thus this type of attack is as hopeless 
as efforts to make a perpetual motion machine (of the second kind). Thus the KLJN 
scheme has perfect security in this case [1]. Moreover, this situation of perfect security 
holds even if the non-ideal feature of a non-zero wire resistance is introduced, see [13]. 
 
2. In general, unconditional security of the non-ideal KLJN scheme at passive attacks is 
guaranteed [1] by the continuity of functions in stable classical physical systems, which 
means that a perfect security level cannot be reached at non-zero temperature, but it can 
be approached asymptotically. This is the exact definition of unconditional security. 
 
3. Unconditional security of the ideal and non-ideal KLJN system at active (i.e., invasive) 
attacks is guaranteed by a current–voltage comparison of Alice’s and Bob’s data—using 
conventional notation—via a publicly authenticated channel. This means that a perfect 
security level cannot be reached at non-zero speed, but it can be approached 
asymptotically [1]. This situation again implies unconditional security. 
 
4. Defense against hacking attack must involve a full statistical and frequency analysis of 
voltages are currents by Alice and Bob moreover the random/arbitrary monitoring of the 
information channel (wire) for the integrity of its system parameters [13]. 
 
Finally, one typical misunderstanding is clarified [2]: Eve can have infinite measurement 
speed and accuracy, but still her information is strongly limited by basic laws of 
information theory and signal processing! The reason is that noise in the KLJN scheme is 
band-limited, as apparent from its power density spectrum S(f) illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Illustration of the band-limited spectrum S(f) of noise in the KLJN system. B denotes bandwidth. 
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According to the Nyquist–Shannon sampling theorem, during a bit exchange period !  a 
measurement can extract only n ! 2B"  independent samples of the measured noise, 
where B is bandwidth, even if Eve has “perfect” measurement instruments with infinite 
bandwidth and accuracy. Alice and Bob have full control over n because they set the 
bandwidth and the duration of the single-bit exchange. Eve’s only ways to extract 
information are to make statistics of the noise under invasive (active) attacks or to exploit 
non-ideal features based on second-(or higher)-order effects. In both cases, Alice and Bob 
can ascertain that Eve’s sample number remains insufficient [2], which means that 
eavesdropping does not occur. Furthermore, Alice and Bob can limit Eve’s information 
still more by discarding high-risk bits that provide information above a publicly agreed 
threshold [1]. 
 
Finally, some additional publications to refer to; math proofs by Gingl and Mingesz that 
only Gaussian noise can provide security [14,15]; statistical analysis of the enhanced 
KLJN system by Smulko [16]; and analysis of the multiple flaws of a recently proposed 
invalid attack claim including and exact proof that the assumption of waves in the KLJN 
regime violates several basic laws of physics [17,18]. 
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